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ABSTRACT
This paper is a study of the aggregate behavior of crop production
in Egypt. We find that output growth rate had declined in the seventies,
but there were some signs of recovery towards the end of the decade.
This trend cannot be explained by the observed counter-cyclical move-
ments in profitability and in the real price of aggregate output. On
the other hand, investment in infrastructure goes a long way towards
explaining the trends both in aggregate output and in land profitability.
Increased investment in agricultural infrastructure tends to raise the
growth rate of the sector and, at the same time, to increase labor's
share in production at the cost of the share of property. Our observa-
tions suggest that aggregate agricultural supply is not very responsive
to prices and that demand for labor is rather inelastic. Therefore,
using the agricultural sector as an absorbent of employment shocks in
the rest of the economy may lead to significant variability in income
distribution.

GROWTH, EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION
IN EGYPTIAN AGRICULTURE: 1964-1979
Although various aspects of Egyptian agriculture have been
brought under increasing scrutiny in recent years, a comprehensive
study of the sector's overall economic performance has been surpris-
ingly absent in the literature. Analyses of aggregate trends are
particularly important since agricultural policy questions are typi-
cally concerned with the overall behavior of the sector, while most
studies have examined the responses of individual crops [1]. These
studies, naturally, fail to provide satisfactory analyses of the agri-
cultural sector and of the role of policy in its development. In this
paper, we intend to take a step towards filling this gap. Using the
Ministry of Agriculture's data base, we examine the major trends in
the agricultural sector of Egypt from 1964 to 1979. This will, then,
enable us to evaluate the factual basis of a number of recent agri-
cultural policy debates in Egypt [2].
The focus of this study is on the country-wide aggregate indica-
tors of agricultural performance [3]. Indices of aggregate produc-
tion, aggregate price level, factor shares and total agricultural
employment are constructed in order to depict a broad view of the
developments in Egyptian agriculture. However, our concern in this
paper is restricted to crop production, and particularly left out is
animal husbandary. Also, fruits and some vegetables are excluded from
our analysis due to lack, of complete data on area, price and yield of
these well-differentiated products. Production of these crops has
been expanding in recent years, but still accounts for only a small
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proportion of the total output. However, two major categories of
vegetables, i.e., potatoes and tomatoes, are included in our sta-
tistics. An extensive discussion of the data base used in this study
can be found in Esfahani (1984).
For aggregation purposes we use the Tornqvis t-Theil indices which
have proven to be reasonable approximations to the aggregate 'true'
indices (Diewert, 1976) [4]. These indices are certainly quite
superior to the constant-price ones usually employed to measure the
variations of aggregate volumes and aggregate prices.
The plan of this paper is as follows: In Section 1, we discuss
the main characteristics of the agricultural sector of Egypt. In
Sections 2 and 3, the main trends in the production and prices of
crops are examined. Fluctuations in agricultural wage and employment
are the subject of our study in Section 4. Changes in income
distribution are analyzed in Section 5. In Section 6, we look, at the
trends in the use of non-factor (intermediate) inputs and at the
related technical changes in Egyptian agriculture. In Section 7, the
development of agricultural infrastructure and investment are con-
sidered. And, finally, Section 8 is the summary and the conclusion of
the paper.
1 . The Main Characteristics of Egyptian Agriculture
Arable lands in Egypt are essentially restricted to the Nile
Valley and its Delta which comprise only about three percent of the
country's total area. This small but highly fertile piece of land
with its rather well-defined borders constitutes the base of an agri-
cultural sector which has been, and still remains, the heart the
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Egyptian economy. Although declining in recent years, this sector
still employs 45 percent of the country's labor force, produces about a
quarter of its GNP, and accounts for more than 30 percent of the
exports (World Bank, 1982).
Egyptian farmers produce a variety of crops. From year to year,
each farmer rotates his crops over two or three pieces of land so that
a uniform soil fertility can be maintained. Since most crops remain
on land only part of the year, the same piece of land may be culti-
vated a number of times each year (usually twice). In addition to
multi-cropping, farmers sometimes practice inter-cropping where two or
more crops grow on the same piece of land at the same time. Thus, due
to the limitation of land and its high fertility, cropping practices
in Egypt have become quite complex. Crops not only compete over land
and other resources across the field, they also interact over time.
For example, if one crop is harvested late, cultivation of another one
may be delayed and its yield reduced.
The three-year rotation seems to be the one most commonly prac-
ticed in Egypt. Usually, in winter, one piece of land is allocated to
wheat and a number of other crops such as barley, beans, lentils,
onions, flax, and winter tomatoes. At the same time, the second piece
is cultivated with berseem (Egyptian clover) and with a number of the
other winter crops just mentioned. Berseem is cut several times
throughout the winter season. For most of berseem, the last cut
occurs sometime in May or June, but a small part of it is preserved
for seeding. The third piece of land begins growing cotton in April
which occupies it until August. Since cotton takes a heavy toll of
the nutritional elements of the soil, the land on which it grows has
to be fortified by remaining fallow for a while or by growing berseem.
This kind of berseem is called 'short-season,' since it is cut only a
few times—usually twice. In summer, the first two pieces of land can
be cultivated with rice, maize, or sorghum along with potatoes, toma-
toes, groundnuts, sesame, and some other crops depending on the
geographical location. The third piece remains tied up with cotton
which in a sense can be regarded a year-round crop. Other year-round
crops such as sugar cane and perennials remain outside this rotation
system.
Traditionally, there has been a third season for growing crops in
the fall after the annual Nile floods. Crops of this season—usually
referred to as 'nili'—have been vanishing since the High Dam brought
the floods under control in the early sixties. However, a few vege-
tables, such as potatoes and tomatoes and some maize are still being
cultivated in the nili season.
Table 1 shows the composition of crop production in Egypt and its
evolution during the 1965-1979 period. The first notable aspect of
this cropping pattern is that it is dominated by only a few crops;
namely, berseem, cotton, maize, rice, tomatoes, and wheat which
together account for about three quarters of the aggregate crop pro-
duction. Among these, berseem and tomatoes have dramatically expanded
their shares in total crop revenue in the seventies. This must have
been a response to the rise in the demand for vegetables and animal
products following the high rates of growth of the urban economy
since 1974. Berseem is a major feed crop and its expansion has been
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enhanced by the hikes in the protected prices of meat and milk. Note
that production of potatoes has also become quite significant in
recent years. The share of cotton, on the other hand, has been
rapidly declining, which is often seen as a result of the low prices
offered by the government.
Nili maize was replaced rapidly by summer maize in the early six-
ties when summer water became plentiful following the construction of
the Aswan High Dam. This process continued slowly well into the
seventies, but in recent years farmers have shown slightly greater
interest in the nili maize again. The share of total maize production
in aggregate output, however, has remained roughly constant. The same
is true about rice and wheat outputs with shares of 8-9 and 10-11 per-
cent, respectively. Note that rice production experienced a rapid
growth in the late sixties, which was probably due to the completion
of the High Dam.
Among the less important crops, flax and sugar cane have been the
only expanding ones; barley and sesame more or less maintained their
shares and beans, sorghum, groundnuts, lentils and onions have lost
their significance to various degrees.
An important aspect of Egypt's agricultural sector is the role of
its public institutions, with the omni-present network of agricultural
cooperatives as their backbone. Theoretically cooperatives provide a
two-way delivery system of goods and services as well as a com-
munication network. Plans for the aggregate output of the sector,
together with the required inputs of fertilizers, seeds, and credit
filter through the cooperative system and eventually are expressed as
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farra-level allocations. All cotton output and parts of various other
crops are requisitioned by the cooperatives as the government agent.
The cooperatives also directly intervene in the conditions of produc-
tion through pooling of fragmented holdings, by helping the implemen-
tation of some area allotments, and by performing various agricultural
tasks, such as applying pesticides and protecting cotton plants.
Cooperatives often provide tractor services for draft power and sta-
tionary threshers at harvest. Goods and services are entered against
the farmer's account, and payment is deducted from the imputed value
of the requisitioned output. Through these means cooperatives affect
production, consumption, and investment in the sector. Also most
government organizations and ministries which are directly or
indirectly involved in the planning and development of the agri-
cultural sector usually operate through the cooperative network.
Enforced membership of cooperatives has been a key tool of sectoral
management since the early sixties.
2. Agricultural Production
The agricultural sector of Egypt experienced high rates of growth
in the late sixties. This fact is reflected in Table 2 and Figure 1
where we present the three-year moving averages of the aggregate crop-
production index. According to the estimates of various sources, the
average rate of growth of Egypt's agricultural sector in the fifties
and sixties has been about 2.0 percent per year (Ikram, 1980, p. 172).
This rate agrees with our estimate of the average growth rate in the
second half of the sixties (see Table 2). However, the sector's
growth through time has not been uniform: a negative rate of growth
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before 1967 turned into a relatively high positive rate between 1968
and 1970 which can perhaps be attributed to favorable weather, to the
recovery of the country from the 1967 War, and to the completion of
the Aswan High Dan and some of its complementary irrigation projects.
In the seventies, agricultural growth rate did not fluctuate much, but
it dwelled at quite low levels; it fell rather sharply at the
beginning of the decade and started to recover very slowly only after
1974. Average growth rate for the whole 1964-1979 period was 1.46.
The estimates of agricultural growth rates in the seventies, as
presented in Figure 1 and Table 2, are somewhat lower than the estima-
tes published by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) , the Food
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) , or by the Ministry of Planning of
Egypt (MOP). The estimates of these sources for the average rate of
growth in the early and mid-seventies is about 1.7 percent (Ikram,
1980, pp. 172-173), while for the same period we find rates of about
1.0 percent. Since the above sources use constant-price indices which
often underestimate the actual growth, the difference the two esti-
mates cannot be reconciled easily. However, an important source of
discrepancy is perhaps the difference in the range of items covered by
the estimates. Most studies include in their estimates the outputs of
animals, of fruits, and of all vegetables which were expanding rather
rapidly in the seventies. Unfortunately, there is no consistent time-
series data for all of these numerous and well-differentiated pro-
ducts and our estimates of agricultural growth do not include most of
them. Our indices are based on the 21 crops listed in Table 1 [5].
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In any case, regardless of the scope and technique of calculation,
all sources seem to agree that Che growth rate of Egyptian agriculture
had declined in the seventies. Indeed, this poor performance in the
context of high rates of growth in the rest of the Egyptian economy
may have been one of the forces behind the vigorous debates over agri-
cultural policies in the past ten years.
One can of course trace the aggregate production performance back
to the trends in the outputs of individual crops. Table 3 shows that
between 1964 and 1967 most crops contributed to the general decline of
the sector. However, expansion of a few important ones such as ber-
seem, rice, sorghum and sugar cane prevented the aggregate index from
falling any further. On the other hand, between 1967 and 1970, out-
puts of most crops were rising, and the declining crops were the less
significant ones. In fact, berseera was the only major crop which did
not grow rapidly in this period. In the early and mid-seventies,
stagnation and decline of three major crops, namely cotton, rice and
berseera, weakened the aggregate performance of the sector to the
extent that was hardly compensated by the continued growth of wheat,
vegetables, and some other winter crops such as barley, flax and len-
tils. Finally, we find that the main components of the recent trend
toward recovery of crop production are cotton, rice, vegetables and
flax. Sorghum and several winter crops such as wheat, beans, lentils
and onions have been declining in the late seventies.
3. Agricultural Prices
Many recent studies of Egyptian agriculture have denoted the
government price policies as the major reason behind the slow growth
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of the sector in the seventies. In this section we examine the main
trends in input and output prices in order to assess the relevance of
this claim.
Table 3 presents the three-year average growth rates of the aggre-
gate output-price index and compares it with the average agricultural
wage rate and with the rural cost-of-living index. A quick look at this
table reveals that between 1965 and 1967 the aggregate output-price
index rose almost at the same rate as did the average agricultural
nominal wages, while the cost-of-living index in rural areas declined.
This process was reversed between 1968 and 1970, when output prices
fell, nominal wages stagnated, and the cost of living rose rapidly.
This radical shift of gears was perhaps due to the fact that after the
1967 War and the subsequent development of foreign exchange shortages
the government could no longer finance its 'equitable growth' policies
and, thus, chose to resort to heavy taxation of agriculture.
In the early seventies the aggregate output-price index seems to
have grown faster than both the wage rate and the cost-of-living
index. However, in the mid- and late-seventies wage inflation took
off and surpassed the output-price and cost-of-living indices which
were growing at about the same rates. Note that if the revenue per
feddan (=1.035 acres) of berseem, given in Table 3, is taken as a proxy
for the cost of animal power used as an input in agriculture, one
finds further indication that profitability of crop production may
have been squeezed in the early and late seventies. However, if prices
of beef and milk are considered as alternative proxies for the cost of
animal power (given at the bottom of Table 3) and subsidies on other
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inputs such as fertilizers, fuels, and machinery are taken into
account, the picture may becomes less clear.
In order to better understand the movements in the real aggregate
prices, we have constructed an aggregate Tornqvist-Theil input-price
index and deflated it by the aggregate output-price index (for details
see Section 6 below). The three-year-average growth rates of this
real input-price index are shown in the last column of Table 2. The
result shows that the only times when real output prices have
experienced positive growth were the mid-sixties and the early seven-
ties. In fact, average growth figures at the bottom of Table 2 make
it clear that on average real output prices have been falling slowly
throughout the 1964—1979 period.
This finding at first may seem to support the view that price
policies have played a major role in agricultural growth. However, a
closer examination reveals some evidence to the contrary. In Figure
1, we have superimposed the graphs of the three-year moving-average
growth rates of the real aggregate input-price index on the existing
similar graph for total output. One immediately observes that the
overall movement of real input prices has been generally pro-cyclical,
implying a countercyclical trend in real output prices. This
obviously cannot happen unless supply response to prices is weak and
production is strongly driven by other factors such as infrastructure,
etc. , which are complementary with variable inputs. Note that the
three-year averaging of the indices and the length of the cycle make
it highly unlikely for the phenomenon to have occurred as a result of
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lagged supply response. In the following sections we will present
further evidence to support this hypothesis [7].
Finally, let us briefly examine the trends in the prices of indi-
vidual crops. The last five columns of Table 3 show that crop prices
have been more or less on the rise in the 1965-67 period, but most of
them declined in the following three years. However, in the seven-
ties, in the spirit of the inflationary mood of the Egyptian economy,
virtually all crop prices were rising again. Note that prices have
not moved uniformly over time or across crops; different crops have
enjoyed more rapid price increases at different times. For this
reason it is rather difficult to pin point consistent trends in the
relative prices of individual crops. Nevertheless, one may observe
that in the seventies there has been some increases in the relative
prices of sugar cane, berseera, and vegetables. Between 1971 and 1979,
on average the absolute prices of these crops grew at rates of more
than 13 percent per year. During the same period, prices of barley,
wheat, and maize with absolute growth rates of less than 10 percent
actually declined relative to other crop prices. On the other hand,
relative prices of cotton and rice, the main export crops, were going
up at rates close to the average aggregate output price rise of 1
1
percent per year. Thus, we find that contrary to some claims, cotton
and rice were not the big losers of the agricultural price policy;
these crops were in the middle range, gaining with respect to some
crops and losing with respect to others. Note that these trends in
prices more or less correspond to the recent production performance of
various crops discussed in Section 2.
-12-
4. Wages and Employment
Between 1964 and 1979 nominal agricultural wages rose almost six-
fold (Table 4). Although most of this increase was washed away by
inflation, according to the index in columns (3) and (5) of Table 4,
in the period under consideration labor must have gained about 4.5
percent per year in terras of real consumption or relative to agri-
cultural output prices. However, the growth of the real wage rate in
the sixties and the seventies was not uniform (see Figure 2). After a
modest growth in the late sixties, the real product wage stagnated and
then began to fall rapidly in the the first half of the seventies.
This situation changed sharply after 1974 and the real wage made large
gains in 1975 and 1976. By 1977, output- price inflation had caught
up with the wage increases and the agricultural real wage rate even
fell somewhat in 1978, but this was more than compensated by the big
jump in 1979.
Column (6) of Table 4 presents an index of agricultural employment
between 1964 and 1979. This index is constructed by dividing the
total cost of labor by the average nominal wage rate for men [8].
Thus, it represents the movements in the actual daily employment in
crop production. Figure 2 shows the graph of the growth rates of this
index, and Table 7 gives their three-year averages. The number of
people 'employed' in agriculture is also given in the last column of
Table 4. This indicator is based on population censuses and labor
force surveys (quoted from Hansen and Radwan, 1982, Table 70), and is
likely to miss the year-to-year variations in the 'intensity' of
employment in agriculture [9]. Below we will compare the properties
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and implications of this index with the new one constructed in this
paper.
Employment in crop production has dropped since 1964 (Table 4,
column (6)). It went up in 1965, but remained almost constant until
1967. After a temporary sharp rise in 1968, it declined rapidly and
was quite low by 1972 (see also Figure 2). The situation improved in
1973 and 1974, but after 1975 agricultural employment fell con-
tinuously, and the partial recovery in 1978 seems short-lived. Note
that the number of people employed in agriculture follows a different
path. According to column (7) of Table 4, agricultural employment was
at its peak in 1972 and thereafter declined with a temporary recovery
in 1975. Therefore, although the two measures of employment are more
or less in agreement in the second half of the seventies, they largely
differ in the first half of the decade. This discrepancy is rather
puzzling since the agricultural wage rate shows a great deal of flexi-
bility and there is little evidence of unemployment in rural Egypt
(Hansen and Radwan, 1982, p. 148). The difference between the two
measures may of course be due to the fact that our figures account for
employment in cultivation activities only and leave out animal produc-
tion. However, there is no evidence of an unusual expansion of animal
husbandry in the early seventies to support this argument. A more
plausible explanation for the difference lies in the fact that "almost
half the (paid) employment of the rural population and more than half
its money income is derived from non-agricultural activities." (Hansen
and Radwan, 1982, p. 140). Therefore, it is not unlikely that when
demand for labor in agriculture falls, workers spend more time in
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other activities. If this phenomenon is combined with a general slow-
down in the urban economy (as was the case in the early seventies), it
is possible to see the number of people working in farms go up even if
their total daily employment is declining. Evidence of reduced demand
for agricultural labor is provided below.
Hansen and Radwan (1982, pp. 154-157) use the number of people
employed in agriculture and the wage rate deflated by the agricultural
value added to show that labor demand in Egyptian agriculture is wage-
elastic and that it can be regarded as a buffer to absorb the
employment shocks in other sectors. However, our analysis points to a
somewhat different direction. A close examination of the employment-
wage relationship in Figure 2 reveals that before 1973 the main
variations in the two indices have been by and large parallel. Then,
beginning 1973, the real wage and employment started to move in oppo-
site directions. It, thus, seems that before 1973 the agricultural
sector faced a rather stable labor-supply curve and employment fluc-
tuations were along this schedule mainly as a result of shifts in the
demand curve. However, after 1973 demand remained more or less
stable, while supply began to shift and, thus, to drive the real wage
rate and the employment level in opposite directions. Therefore, if
our observations are correct, wage elasticities of supply and demand
curves in the agricultural labor market may be inferred from the rela-
tive wage-employment variations in the two sub-periods before and
after 1973. It is evident from Figure 2 that fluctuations of the wage
rate have been larger than those of the employment level, indicating
rather inelastic demand and supply curves [10]. Note that the strong
responses of the real wage in the mid-seventies points to a par-
ticularly inelastic labor demand schedule. We therefore conclude that
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using Che agricultural sector as an employment buffer may imply large
variations in the wage rate and, thus, considerable changes in income
distribution. Evidence on the main trends of factor shares presented
in the next section confirms this conclusion and further supports our
labor market hypothesis.
5. Factor Incomes and Factor Shares
In this section we examine the trends in the factor distribution
of income in agriculture in order to understand how it has responded
to the changes in the sector. In the first five columns of Tables 5,
nominal per feddan values of labor costs, 'rent 1
,
'profit', and their
combinations are given. Indices of 'real' values of these variables,
reported in the last five columns of the same tables, are formed by
deflating them by the rural cost-of-living index. Table 6 , on the
other hand, presents the shares of factor and non-factor inputs in the
total value of crop production in Egypt.
It is clear from Table 5 that the real labor income per feddan of
(physical) agricultural land, after peaking in the mid-sixties, has
declined in the late sixties and early seventies. However, it has
made a strong recovery during the second half of the seventies. Labor
share in the total value of crop output, reported in the first column
of Table 6, has also followed a similar path, but with a two-year lag:
it fell to its lowest level in 1973 and 1974 and went up quickly in
1975 and again in 1979. It is interesting to note that the trend in
the labor share is highly correlated with the trend in the real agri-
cultural wage rate (compare column (5) of Table 4 and the first column
of Table 6). This, of course, is a clear indication of a low substi-
tutability between labor and other agricultural inputs, and provides
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further evidence for the low elasticity of labor demand in Egyptian
agriculture hypothesized in the previous section.
A problem with the labor shares given in Table 6 is that they seem
to be rather low when compared with the estimates of other studies of
Egyptian agriculture. For example, calculating the agricultural fac-
tor shares for 1951, Hansen (1968) finds the share of labor in total
production to be 35 percent, which seems unlikely to have dropped to
about 17 percent in the mid-sixties. Part of the explanation of this
large gap falls on the fact that Hansen's estimate of labor income is
based on the number of people employed in agriculture times the
average wage rate, assuming full-employment. As mentioned above,
while 'full-employment' in rural areas is a valid assumption, it cannot
be all attributed to agriculture. Another source of discrepancy bet-
ween the the two estimates must of course be due to the fact that the
relatively more labor intensive animal production activities have not
been included in our estimates [11].
The 'rent' category in Tables 5 and 6 refers to the 'official'
rent and does not truly reflect the 'market' price of land in Egypt.
Note that nominal rents remain essentially constant until 1975, after
which, following the spirit of the 'open door' policy, rent controls
may have weakened. The 'official' rent data may be of interest for
understanding the situation of landlords who could not bypass the rent
controls legally and make special arrangements with their tenants.
Evidently, the real income and the output share of these 'absentee'
landlords has declined more or less continuously throughout the period
under consideration.
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1 Profit' in Tables 5 and 6 is calculated as the residual of gross
revenue over the total cost of factor and non-factor (intermediate)
inputs plus 'rent.' However, since 'rent' does not reflect the
returns to land, the 'profit' which is calculated in this manner
includes part of the marginal productivity of land as well as the
returns to infrastructure, management and the like. An interesting
way to interpret the 'profit' category is to consider it as the income
of a capitalist tenant who has rented in a piece of land at the offi-
cial rates and is exclusively dependent on wage labor for his produc-
tion. The income of such tenants should, thus, largely depend on the
real agricultural wage rates. Indeed, we find that as crop prices
fell and real wages rose in the late sixties, real 'profit' declined;
but it went up rapidly in the early seventies when the real wage rate
began to deteriorate. In the second half of the seventies, real
'profit' has again suffered as a result of the two major wage shocks
in 1975 and in 1979. The share of 'profit' in total crop revenue has
also had a similar behavior peaking in 1974 when the labor share was
at its lowest point.
If one is interested in the total returns to land, or the income
of capitalist farmers who own the land under their operation, one has
to look at the 'rent plus profit' category [12]. Since 'profit' has a
large share in total revenue and fluctuates rather strongly, it domi-
nates the 'rent plus profit' indices as well. Therefore, like
'profit', total profitability of land has had peaks in 1967, 1974, and
1978. It is particularly interesting to note that real profitability
of land in terms of consumption goods and in terms of its share in
total crop revenue displays a clear negative correlation with the rate
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of growth of output. Indeed the highest land shares were attained in
the mid-seventies when output growth was the lowest. This observation
confirms the hypothesis that profitability could not have played a
major role in the aggregate production growth.
On the other hand it indicates that factors which contribute to
the growth of output tend to reduce the share of land in total reve-
nue. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that the determinates
of aggregate growth are mainly land-augmenting activities, and that
the elasticity of substitution between land and other factors is
rather low. Note in Table 6 that the total returns to land account
for about 47 to 65 percent of aggregate crop production. Such a large
contribution reflects the key role of land in Egyptian agriculture and
explains why land-augmenting investment may have a significant impact
on its output. Here we find indicators that such investment may also
have strong influences on the distribution of income between land and
labor.
Finally, we turn to the indicators of income of farmers who culti-
vate their own land (mainly small farmers). These indicators are the
returns to, and the share of, 'labor plus rent plus profit.' The
movements in 'profit' indices again more or less dominate these indi-
cators for the most part, but variations in labor income have a
strong counterbalancing effect. The real income of the owner-operated
farms seems to have deteriorated in the late sixties, but it has been
improving since the early seventies.
6. Non-Factor Inputs and Technical Change
The increase in total factor share—i.e. , the share of labor,
'rent', and 'profit'—from about 70 percent in the late sixties to
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about 77 percent in the second half of the seventies implies a
simultaneous reduction of the share of non-factor (intermediate)
inputs from 30 percent down to 23 percent. According to Table 6, the
main components of this large decline are the diminishing shares of
animal power and of fertilizer. The small share of insecticides has
also decreased somewhat. In fact, mechanical power is the only com-
ponent among non-factor inputs, besides 'sundries,' which has had a
rising share in the period under consideration. Seeds and manure seem
to have kept their shares more or less constant.
In Table 7, we have compiled the average growth rates of agri-
cultural inputs. Since we had the nominal costs for each input cate-
gory, we needed appropriate price indices in order to calculate the
indices for input volumes. However, only the wage rate and the price
of fertilizers were available, and we had to come up with reasonable
proxies for other input prices. Since the price of using animals in
production is essentially their feed costs, we assumed that revenue
per feddan of berseem— the major feed crop in Egypt—is a good proxy
for the price of animal power [13]. We have deflated the costs of
mechanical power and manure by the official rate of inflation using
the rural consumer price index as a proxy. Furthermore, we have
assumed that nominal prices of insecticides have remained constant and
that the prices of seeds are equal to the lagged prices of crops them-
selves.
According to Table 7, between 1965 and 1970 inputs of human and
animal labor were expanding, but in the 1971-1979 period this process
has been reversed and both inputs have been declining with the same
speed that they were growing before. On the other hand, uses of
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mechanical power, manure, fertilizer and insecticides have continued
to expand although at somewhat slower rates [14]. As we have seen in
Section 4, the reduction in employment seems to have been a response
to the wage hikes following the supply shocks of the mid- and late-
seventies. Animal unit costs have also risen sharply during the same
period, but unlike labor, animal power has lost its share in total
revenue, implying greater substitutability of animals with other
inputs in crop production and, thus, a rather elastic demand for ani-
mal power. If this argument is correct, a case can be made for the
hypothesis put forward by deJanvry and Subarrao (1983) claiming that in
the seventies mechanization of Egyptian agriculture has mainly
displaced animal power and not human labor which has proven to be a
more specific factor.
It is interesting that despite the rapid growth of fertilizer
input, its revenue share has continuously declined. This is, of
course, due to fertilizer-price controls which have kept the nominal
prices of almost all types of fertilizer fixed since 1964 (Cuddihy,
1980, Table V.l). This phenomenon also reappears in the case of
insecticides, which are by and large controlled and applied by govern-
ment agencies.
Let us now look at the behavior of the aggregate input index for
which Figure 1 shows the graph of the three-year moving-average growth
rates along with similar graphs for aggregate output and real input-
price indices (see also Table 7). The real input-price index is simply
the aggregate input-volume deflator divided by the aggregate output-
price index. All inputs listed in Table 7, except insecticides which
are considered fixed costs, are included in the price and volume indi-
ces of aggregate input.
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The first noticeable point about input and output graphs in Figure
1 is that they are not as highly correlated as one expects them to be.
The reason of course lies in the fact that changes in weather and in
infrastructure are not captured in our aggregate input index. In
Egypt, a large part of variation in agricultural output is due to
availability of water and proper drainage facilities which are not
under the control of farmers. We will come back to issue of
infrastructure below.
The second point about the relationship between aggregate input
and aggregate output indices is that to the extent that they are
correlated the former has clearly greater variations than the latter.
This observation underscores the scarcity of land in Egyptian agri-
culture and the operation of the law of diminishing returns to
variable inputs. However, note that there may have been some produc-
tivity gains in the seventies which are reflected in the average
growth rate of aggregate input volume being close to zero while output
has grown at a rate of over one percent. This productivity gain
explains why despite declining real output prices profitability has
increased in the seventies.
7. Investment and Infrastructure
The main components of agricultural infrastructure in Egypt are
arable land, systems of irrigation and drainage, and research institu-
tions for the improvement of crop varieties. As a tradition, and prob
ably for economic and social reasons, most of these elements have
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been developed by the government. Particularly in the last two de-
cades, private investment has constituted only a very small proportion
of the total investment in Egyptian agriculture.
In Table 8 we have been able to distinguish two types of agri-
cultural investment: irrigation and drainage on the one hand, and
land reclamation, etc. , on the other hand. The irrigation and
drainage category includes the investment in the Aswan High Dam except
the part which is related to power generation. In the 'other' cate-
gory, land reclamation constitutes the bulk of investment.
Unfortunately, we have not been able to find a separate time-series
for investment in agricultural research in Egypt.
Several important observations can be made with respect to the two
types of investment shown in Table 8. The most important observation
is that real investment in irrigation and drainage was cut into half
between 1969 and 1971. This was partly due to the completion of the
High Dam in 1970, and partly due to the shortage of foreign exchange
between the two wars with Israel. However, although total investment
in the economy as a whole dwindled in the early seventies, the con-
tinuously falling share of agriculture makes it clear that there must
have been a deliberate government policy to reduce investment in agri-
culture. According to Table 8, the share of agriculture in total
national investment has dropped from about 20 percent in 1965 to about
6 percent in 1975. Thereafter the decline of the share levels off
just above 7 percent. Note that actual real investment in agriculture
has increased rapidly in 1977 and 1978. This is a reflection of the
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easad foreign exchange situation and the subsequent investment boom in
Egypt.
The next observation concerns the differences in the trends of the
two types of agricultural investment. Note that the drop in the real
investment during the early seventies is much stronger and has a
slower recovery for irrigation and drainage than for the 'other' cate-
gory. Indeed, the level of 'other' investment in 1975 is almost the
same as it is in 1965 in real terras, while the volume of irrigation
and drainage investment stands about 40 percent below its 1965 level.
These facts are indications of the priority of land reclamation in the
investment decisions of the government; a policy which has received
much criticism from all quarters. Several field studies and econo-
metric works have found land-reclamation projects detrimental to
Egyptian agriculture, but the desire to expand the land base of the
sector has provided the government with sufficient momentum to proceed
with its own policies [15].
Finally, note that the period of reduced investment in agriculture
coincides, with a short lag, with the slow down of growth of agri-
cultural production in Egypt. In order to demonstrate the relation-
ship between production and investment in the agriculture sector more
emphatically, we have constructed an index of infrastructural 'capital
stock' by using the investment data in Table 8 and by assuming an ini-
tial growth rate of 3 percent in 1965 and a depreciation rate of 5
percent per year [16]. In Figure 1, we have super-imposed the graph
of the three-year moving-average growth rates of this index on that of
the aggregate output. The parallel movement of the two curves
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in the seventies is quite remarkable [17]. The negative and low
growth rates of output around 1967 is of course largely due to the
repercussions of the Six-Day War.
8. Conclusion
In this paper we have examined various indices of aggregate per-
formance of Egyptian agriculture in recent years. We have found that
in the seventies, the aggregate growth of crop production in Egypt has
slowed down. We have also found that aggregate real output prices
(aggregate output prices deflated by input prices) although on average
declining, have been moving counter-cyclically. Since such price
movements cannot account for the observed cycles of aggregate output,
we are confronted with the puzzle of the source of these fluctuations.
A plausible factor which may explain a great deal of the main trends
in the aggregate output is investment in agricultural infrastructure.
For this hypothesis to be true, however, aggregate production should
be rather insensitive to prices, which seems to be the case according
to our price-quantity and factor-shares evidence. Thus, we find that
the decline of investment in irrigation and drainage as well as in
other projects which affect the fertility of land go a long way
towards explaining the slow growth of Egyptian agriculture in the
seventies.
As we have seen, total returns to land, which includes the returns
to infrastructure, amount to about 47 to 65 percent of total crop
revenue. This reflects the significance of the contribution of this
factor to production. Therefore, expansion of production is very much
dependent on the extent to which land can be vertically or horizon-
tally augmented. Horizontal extension of agricultural land has not
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proven very successful yet, and has received a great deal of criti-
cism. On the other hand, vertical extension through improvements in
irrigation and particularly in drainage systems, has been found quite
effective, but seems rather neglected by the policy-makers. Due to
the low elasticity of substitution among land, labor, and other fac-
tors, augmentation of land has an important implication for income
distribution as well: as production expands and the demand for
variable inputs goes up, the share of land falls and the share of
labor rises. Exactly the opposite of this process occurred in the
mid-seventies. This effect has been so far overlooked by most stu-'
dents of Egyptian agriculture.
Insensitivity of aggregate output to prices does not necessarily
imply inelastic demand for all inputs. Since land is the major fixed
factor constraining production, demand for some inputs may be highly
responsive to prices without output being significantly affected.
Demand for animal power, due to its apparent subs titutability with
mechanical power, belongs to this category. However, demand for labor
does not seem to be very elastic. Evidence supporting this claim has
been provided by the large responses of the real wage rate to the
shifts in the agricultural labor supply after 1973. Implications of
this hypothesis for changes in income distribution are of course far
reaching. It particularly implies that using agriculture as an absor-
bent of employment shocks in the rest of the economy—suggested by
Hansen and Radwan (1982)—may lead to significant changes in income
distribution. Indeed, in this paper, we find that the agricultural
factor shares in the past decade have been highly variable and
strongly affected by the real wage shocks.
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Notes
[1] See, for example, Hansen and Nashashibi (1975), Cuddihy (1980),
and von Braun (1980).
[2] For examples of recent debates on Egypt's economic policies see:
Ikram (1980), Richards (1980), Hansen and Radwan (1982), Richards and
Martin (1983), and those mentioned in footnote [1].
[3] We have analyzed the regional aspects of Egyptian agricultural
development elsewhere in Esfahani (1985).
[4] If there are n components x. , i=l,...,n. their Trongvist-Theil
* »
£
aggregate index Q in period t is defined by:
n





1=1 * ' '
where s, ^ is the two-year (t and t-1) moving average of the share of
component i in the total value of all components.
[5] The question whether our estimates have any value or not depends
crucially on the relationship between cultivation and animal husbandry
in agriculture. If these are inseparable activities, then our estima-
tes are quite deficient. However, to the extent that these two acti-
vities are separate lines of production with simple input-output
relationships, concentrating on one activity alone can still be quite
fruitful. Note that if the activities of rural households are the
focus of attention, animal husbandry should be included in the pic-
ture, but so should many non-agricultural activities, since only about
one half of incomes in rural Egypt are derived from agriculture (Hansen
and Radwan, 1982, p. 99).
[6] The output growth rates in Table 3 belong to the primary products
of crops. Investigation of the data indicates a very close rela-
tionship between the outputs of primary and secondary products of all
of the crops under consideration.
[7] Esfahani (1985) provides cross-sectional evidence for the low
price responsiveness of aggregate supply in four main agricultural
regions in Egypt. Our econometric work on six governorates in the
Delta region (Esfahani, 1984) also confrims this hypothesis.
[8] Total labor cost includes both costs of hired and (imputed) family
labor. Cost of labor in the Ministry of Agriculture data base is not
broken down into male, female, or child labor categories. However, as
long as the wage rates for these types of labor move together, our
employment index will measure the 'male-equivalent' of all types of
labor. Indeed, very close relationships have been observed in the
agricultural labor market among the wage rates of men, women, and
children in the past two decades (see Mohie-Eldin, 1982).
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[9 J Labor Force Surveys are carried out during the month of June which
is a peak season in Egyptian agriculture. This data may not reflect
any variations in employment in the rest of the year. It also does
not measure the variations in female labor force which is usually
highly underestimated in surveys and censuses.
[10] Our econometric work on the Delta region (Esfahani, 1984) sup-
ports this hypothesis. Further cross-sectional evidence is presented
in Esfahani (1985).
[11] Mohie-Eldin (1982) also presents estimates of the shares of labor
between 1960 and 1976 which are about 25 to 35 percent higher than
those given in Table 6. His value added and labor income data are
based on the Ministry of Planning' s follow-up reports which are rather
crude estimates. However, the trend in Mohie-Eldin' s estimate is very
similar to the results obtained in this paper.
[12] Hansen's estimates of rent and profit shares in 1951 are 44 and
13 percent, respectively (Hansen, 1968; Table 2). These estimates are
markedly different from what we observe in Table 6. However, note
that the sum of rent and profit share estimated by Hansen is 57 per-
cent which is in the range of property income shares we find in this
paper.
[13] Separate data for price and yield of berseem are not available.
[14] Note that mechanical power use starts from a very limited base in
the mid-sixties and even small changes in its absolute value give rise
to the erratic growth rates observed in 1968-1970.
[15] For a discussion on this point see Ikram (1980). For an example
of econometric work see Esfahani (1984).
[16] The shape of the resulting curve and its correlation with produc-
tion behavior is not sensitive to these assumptions.
[17] Econometric testing of this hypothesis for six governorates in
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TABLE 1
AVERAGE SHARES OF CROPS IN THE TOTAL VALUE
OF CROP PRODUCTION IN EGYPT: 1965-1979
(percentages)
CROPS \ YEARS 65-67 68-70 71-73 74-76 77-79
BARLEY 0.71 0.57 0.52 0.63 0.61
BEANS 2.95 2.30 2.30 2.26 1.97
BERSEEH,LONG 17.53 14.46 16.73 17.45 21.24
BERSEEH, SHORT 8.86 5.69 6.49 5.78 6.32
COTTON 23.59 25.15 22.65 16.95 16.74
FLAX 0.10 0.16 0.18 0.28 0.32
GROUNDNUTS 0.61 0.54 0.34 0.38 0.37
LENTILS 0.61 0.46 0.73 0.53 0.18
MAIZE, SUMNER 9.56 10.39 10.99 10.96 10.63
MAIZE, NILI 2.82 2.17 1.92 2.30 2.72
ONIONS 0.67 0.54 0.53 0.56 0.41
POTATQES,NILI 0.62 0.85 1.14 1.73 1.86
POTATOES, SUMMER 0.71 0.78 1.01 1.65 2.07
RICE 8.01 12.07 8.80 8.70 8.59
SESANE 0.23 0.28 0.36 0.23 0.23
SORGHUM 3.59 3.61 3.62 3.03 2.39
SUGAR CANE 2.27 2.99 3.02 4.97 4.62
TOHATOES,NILI 2.03 2.10 3.69 4.20 2.41
TOMATOES, SUHHER 1.85 2.19 1.99 2.15 2.74
TOHATOES, WINTER 2.18 2.62 2.64 3.88 3.25
WHEAT 10.49 10.10 10.35 11.40 10.33
TOTAL 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: Coiputed froi Ministry of Agriculture data.
TABLE 2
SfiONTH RATES OF CROP PRODUCTION AND PRICES
IN RURAL E6YPT: 1965-1979
AVERAGE COST OF REAL
A66RE5ATE A66RE6ATE AGRICULTURAL LIVING AGGREGATE
YEARS PRODUCTION OUTPUT PRICES MAGE RATE INDEX INPUT PRICE
65-67 -0.93 5.74 6.39 -4.01 -0.49
68-70 4.69 -2.72 0.00 6.15 1.75
71-73 1.01 8.64 5.18 4.59 -3.32
74-76 1.11 11.13 24.83 11.98 4.53
77-79 1.42 13.23 18.15 9.66 0.99
65-70 1.88 1.51 3.20 1.07 0.63
71-79 1.18 11.00 16.05 8.74 0.73
Sources: Cost of living index: Central Agency for Public Mobilization and
Statistics KAPHAS).
Others: coiputed froi Ministry of Agriculture data.
TABLE 3
AVERAGE 6R0NTH RATES OF OUTPUTS AW FARM-GATE PRICES
OF E6YPTIAN CROPS: 1965-1979*
OUTPUT PRICE
CROPS \ YEARS 65-67 68-70 71-73 74-76 77-79 65-67 68-70 71-73 74-76 77-79
BARLEY -11.64 -6.00 4.69 8.39 -0.40 4.26 -3.11 4.05 10.62 11.17
BEANS -22.18 12.99 -0.58 -2.31 -2.54 4.50 -6.70 4.55 21.30 11.02
BERSEEH,L0N62 7.48 1.02 1.50 2.43 0.68 0.70 -8.23 16.03 9.37 15.86
8ERSEEH, SHORT 2 -1.57 -0.39 1.50 -6.83 -0.47 0.49 -8.45 16.69 8.06 16.27
COTTON -5.78 5.02 -0.87 -7.75 5.73 0.68 2.07 2.70 16.43 12.76
FLAX -14.26 1.74 23.07 7.42 11.83 4.64 3.41 9.04 11.18 12.51
GROUNDNUTS -12.26 6.01 -13.02 3.17 -1.82 15.41 -2.10 1.93 22.03 14.91
LENTILS -14.52 -0.75 20.65 -16.19 -47.57 13.38 1.99 2.15 10.32 17.40
MAIZE, SUMMER 35.59 4.20 2.50 5.82 -2.42 11.15 -3.40 11.32 3.62 14.73
MAIZE, NIL! -39.35 -0.37 -3.57 10.14 4.53 9.69 -3.57 13.03 2.77 15.35
ONIONS -8.17 -7.44 0.41 1.38 -14.14 6.65 3.37 10.36 14.17 14.00
POTATOES, NILI -14.24 28.11 12.50 5.83 -0.85 19.75 -8.50 3.72 31.11 7.88
POTATOES, SUMMER -6.29 17.38 12.43 1.40 10.04 11.05 -0.10 2.68 33.79 4.59
RICE 3.82 4.44 -4.51 0.34 2.94 12.74 -1.96 2.16 18.82 9.96
SESAME -37.98 33.02 2.07 -16.61 -0.96 10.20 1.84 2.65 14.39 25.09
SORGHUM 6.99 -0.02 -0.45 -4.53 -4.97 9.34 -1.43 12.36 4.34 12.02
SUGAR CANE 2.43 9.20 1.89 4.64 1.33 6.61 0.52 8.65 26.96 13.44
TOMATOES, NILI 1.58 7.53 8.15 1.03 -4.26 3.56 7.13 21.94 3.39 2.81
TOMATOES, SUMMER 10.60 -0.09 -0.21 12.91 8.56 9.13 0.79 9.88 -1.63 20.11
TOMATOES, WINTER -12.58 19.29 -10.61 16.90 10.96 32.37 -20.51 24.01 3.54 -2.67
WHEAT -4.87 5.40 6.39 2.16 -1.83 9.77 2.26 -0.98 8.42 17.23
AVERAGE A6RIC.
NA6E RATE - - - - - 6.39 0.00 5.18 24.83 18.15
COST OF
LIVING INDEX - - - - - -4.01 6.15 4.59 11.98 9.66
PRICE OF BEEF - - - - - 3.98 5.12 4.74 16.91 10.16
PRICE OF MILK _ _ . _ _ 12.97 -4.70 7.88 16.76 13.46
1 Weighted averages of prices of priiary and secondary products.
2 Instead of output and price of berseei, its area and revenue per feddan are used.
Data on price and yield of berseei is available only for 1978 and 1979.
Source: Coiputed froi Ministry of Agriculture data. For cost of living index see Table 6.
TABLE 4
HA6ES AND EMPLOYMENT IN E6YPTIAN AGRICULTURE: 1964-1979
AVERA6E COST Or REAL A66RE6ATE REAL AGRICULTURAL NUMBER OF
A6R I CULTURAL LIVING CONSUMPTION OUTPUT PRODUCT EMPLOYMENT PEOPLE EMPLOYED
YEAR MAGE RATE INDEX WAGE INDEI PRICE INDEI MAGE INDEI INDEI IN AGRICULTURE
(PT PER DAY) (1964=100) (1964=100) (1964=100) (1964=100) (1964=100) COOO)
(1) (2) (3):(l)/(2) (4) (5):(l)/(3)
100.0
(6) (7)
1964 19.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n.a.
1965 22.0 118.5 97.7 105.1 110.2 111.9 it. a.
1966 25.0 106.9 123.1 116.0 113.4 110.8 4300
1967 25.0 109.4 120.3 118.8 110.8 111.4 n.a.
1968 24.0 113.9 110.9 102.8 122.9 119.4 4781
1969 25.0 122.4 107.5 106.2 124.0 114.6 n.a.
1970 25.0 131.5 100.0 109.5 120.2 111.5 n.a.
1971 25.5 132.5 101.3 111.1 120.8 109.5 5085
1972 27.5 139.9 103.4 122.1 118.5 98.1 5294
1973 29.2 150.9 101.8 141.9 108.3 102.5 5005
1974 32.2 171.9 98.6 174.5 97.1 112.3 4776
1975 46.5 192.9 126.9 177.5 137.9 104.4 5033
1976 61.5 216.2 149.7 198.2 163.4 98.3 4900
1977 76.4 237.2 169.5 243.9 164.9 95.2 4767
1978 88.5 273.7 170.2 300.0 155.3 98.0 4523
1979 106.0 289.0 193.1 294.7 189.3 96.9 n.a.
n.a. Not Available.
Sources: Cost of living index: Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPHAS).
Nuiber of people eiployed in agriculture: Hansen and Radwan (1980, Table 70);
Others: coiputed froi Ministry of Agriculture data.
TABLE 5
MEASURES OF NOMINAL AND REAL PROFITABILITY OF LAND IN E6YPT: 1964-1979






YEAR LABOR RENT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT LABOR RENT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT
1964 14.34 23.33 39.45 62.78 77.12 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
1965 18.92 24.95 34.39 59.35 78.26 111.37 90.28 73.58 79.78 85.65
1966 20.69 25.25 36.30 61.55 82.23 135.01 101.29 86.08 91.73 99.78
1967 20.98 25.14 37.98 63.13 84.10 133.79 98.56 88.04 91.95 99.72
1968 21.04 25.23 24.84 50.07 71.11 128.88 94.99 55.30 70.05 80.99
1969 21.08 26.02 30.72 56.74 77.82 120.17 91.13 63.62 73.84 82.45
1970 20.70 26.69 40.19 66.89 87.59 109.80 87.00 77.46 81.01 86.36
1971 20.62 26.02 43.15 69.17 89.79 108.59 84.21 82.56 83.17 87.90
1972 19.81 26.47 57.93 84.41 104.21 98.74 81.10 104.94 96.08 96.57
1973 21.87 27.01 75.32 102.33 124.20 101.05 76.70 126.48 107.98 106.70
1974 26.33 28.21 98.00 126.21 152.54 106.83 70.35 144.48 116.93 115.05
1975 34.99 29.54 88.11 117.65 152.63 126.52 65.65 115.77 97.15 102.61
1976 43.60 34.47 96.39 130.86 174.46 140.65 68.34 112.99 96.40 104.62
1977 52.57 36.97 122.59 159.57 212.14 154.60 66.82 130.99 107.15 115.97
1978 62.66 39.09 174.36 213.45 276.11 159.69 61.22 161.47 124.22 130.81
1979 73.99 57.51 140.54 198.05 272.03 178.59 85.30 123.27 109.16 122.07
* Noiinal values deflated by the rural cost of living index.
Sources: Cost of living index: CAPHAS; others: coiputed froi Ministry of Agriculture data.
TABLE 6
INPUT SHARES IN THE TOTAL CROP REVENUE IN EGYPT: 1964-1979
ANIMAL MECHANICAL FERTI- INSECTI- RENT* RENT+
YEAR LABOR POWER POWER SEEDS MANURE LIZER CIDES SUNDRIES RENT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT
1964 14.17 6.14 1.88 4.49 2.79 5.13 1.53 0.87 23.06 39.00 62.05 76.22
1965 17.61 7.87 1.52 4.18 3.07 5.55 1.96 0.94 23.23 32.02 55.24 72.85
1966 18.00 7.69 1.66 4.25 3.04 6.55 2.34 0.97 21.98 31.59 53.57 71.57
1967 18.02 7.30 1.79 4.52 3.14 6.64 1.22 1.00 21.60 32.64 54.24 72.26
1968 19.81 8.39 2.25 5.42 3.74 7.61 1.16 1.13 23.76 23.39 47.15 66.96
1969 18.29 5.34 5.08 4.87 3.40 7.26 1.76 1.03 22.57 26.64 49.21 67.50
1970 17.04 4.83 5.88 4.83 3.19 7.39 1.77 1.04 21.97 33.09 55.06 72.10
1971 16.57 4.91 5.51 4.84 3.19 7.16 2.24 1.08 20.91 34.68 55.59 72.17
1972 14.31 4.39 5.12 4.41 3.22 6.56 1.04 0.99 19.12 41.85 60.97 75.28
1973 13.72 3.61 4.30 4.13 2.90 6.02 1.10 0.88 16.95 47.27 64.22 77.94
1974 13.69 3.40 4.23 3.86 2.69 5.43 1.05 0.92 14.67 50.97 65.64 79.34
1975 17.55 3.54 5.33 4.64 3.44 5.30 1.19 1.51 14.82 44.20 59.02 76.57
1976 19.24 3.86 5.39 4.75 3.08 4.93 1.01 1.42 15.21 42.53 57.73 76.97
1977 19.24 3.80 5.18 5.03 2.86 4.55 0.95 1.28 13.53 44.86 58.39 77.63
1978 17.92 3.31 5.08 5.52 2.59 3.84 0.71 1.34 11.18 49.86 61.04 78.95
1979 21.11 4.15 5.10 4.46 2.91 4.25 1.51 1.54 16.41 40.10 56.51 77.62
Source: Computed froa the Ministry of Agriculture data.
TABLE 7
AVERAGE GROWTH RATES OF THE MAIN AGRICULTURAL INPUTS
IN EGYPT: 1965-1979
ANIMAL MECHANICAL INSECTI- AGGREGATE
YEARS LABOR POWER POWER SEEDS MANURE FERTILIZER CIDES INPUT
65-67 3.61 9.80 0.04 -1.67 5.67 13.34 -2.70 5.47
68-70 0.02 -3.62 35.43 7.08 -3.68 5.47 14.23 4.25
71-73 -2.81 -16.13 -5.44 -0.34 1.79 2.79 -6.39 -3.02
74-76 -1.40 5.04 7.73 4.41 2.23 5.51 9.33 2.29
77-79 -0.46 1.06 3.07 -5.01 3.01 9.59 28.10 0.94
65-70 1.82 3.09 17.73 2.70 1.00 9.40 5.76 4.86
71-79 -1.56 -3.34 1.78 -0.31 2.34 5.96 10.35 0.07
Source: Calculated frot Ministry of Agriculture data.
TABLE 8
A6RICULTURAL INVESTMENT IN EGYPT: 1965-1978
CONSTAN r PERCENT OF
CURRENT PRICES* 1965 PRICES* TOTAL INVESTMENT
DRAINAGE/ DRAINAGE/ DRAINAGE/
YEAR IRRIGATION OTHER IRRIGATION OTHER IRRIGATION OTHER
1965 51.6 30.7 51.6 30.7 12.5 7.4
1966 50.9 31.1 47.5 29.1 12.2 7.5
1967 31.6 24.6 28.5 22.2 8.7 6.8
1968 42.0 25.6 37.6 22.9 12.7 7.8
1969 34.3 27.0 30.2 23.7 9.3 7.4
1970 25.4 27.9 20.2 22.2 6.0 6.5
1971 21.6 22.3 15.0 15.5 5.0 5.2
1972 22.0 28.3 16.1 20.7 5.3 6.8
1973 22.4 35.2 18.0 28.2 5.0 7.9
1974 21.5 32.7 17.5 26.6 2.9 4.5




1977 139.0 72.6 7.3
1978 179.0 82.9 7.5
* Hill ions of LE. investment at constant prices calculated by
dividing noiinal values by a price index for total investient.
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